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1The Good, the Bad and the Ugly:
A Study of Security Decisions in a Cyber-Physical
Systems Game
Sylvain Frey, Awais Rashid, Pauline Anthonysamy, Maria Pinto-Albuquerque, and Syed Asad Naqvi
Motivation: The security of any system is a direct con-
sequence of stakeholders’ decisions regarding security re-
quirements and their relative prioritisation. Such decisions
are taken with varying degrees of expertise in security. In
some organisations – particularly those with resources – these
are the preserve of computer (or information) security teams.
In others – typically smaller organisations – the computing
services team may be charged with the responsibility. Often
managers have a role to play as guardians of business targets
and goals. Be it common workplace practices or strategic
decision making, security decisions underpin not only the
initial security requirements and their prioritisation but also the
adaptation and evolution of these requirements as new business
or security contexts arise.
However, little is currently understood about how these
various demographics approach cyber security decisions and
the strategies and approaches that underpin those decisions.
What are the typical decision patterns, if any, the consequences
of such patterns and their impact (positive or negative) on the
security of the system in question? Nor is there any substantial
understanding of how the strategies and decision patterns of
these different groups contrast. Is security expertise necessarily
an advantage when making security decisions in a given
context? Answers to these questions are key to understanding
the “how” and “why” behind security decision processes.
The Game: In this talk1, we present a tabletop game –
Decisions and Disruptions (D-D)2 – as a means to investigate
these very questions. The game tasks a group of players with
managing the security of a small utility company while facing a
variety of threats. The game provides a requirements sandbox
in which players can experiment with threats, learn about
decision making and its consequences, and reflect on their
own perception of risk. The game is intentionally kept short
– 2 hours – and simple enough to be played without prior
training. A cyber-physical infrastructure, depicted through a
Lego® board, makes the game easy to understand and accessible
to players from varying backgrounds and security expertise,
without being too trivial a setting for security experts.
Key insights: We played D-D with 43 players divided into
homogeneous groups (group sizes of 2-6 players): 4 groups
of security experts, 4 groups of non-technical managers and
4 groups of general computer scientists. Such observations
1Original journal paper: S. Frey, A. Rashid, P. Anthonysamy, M. Pinto-
Albuquerque, and S. A. Naqvi. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: A Study of
Security Decisions in a Cyber-Physical Systems Game. IEEE TSE, 2017.
2Game rules available at: http://decisions-disruptions.org.
should, of course, not be generalised, however, the substantial
sample size enables in-depth qualitative analysis. Our analysis
reveals a number of novel insights regarding security decisions
of our three demographics:
• Strategies: Security experts had a strong interest in
advanced technological solutions and tended to neglect
intelligence gathering, to their own detriment: some
security expert teams achieved poor results in the game.
Managers, too, were technology-driven and focused on
data protection while neglecting human factors more than
other groups. Computer scientists tended to balance human
factors and intelligence gathering with technical solutions,
and achieved the best results of the three demographics.
• Decision Processes: Technical experience significantly
changes the way players think. Teams with little technical
experience had shallow, intuition-driven discussions with
few concrete arguments. Technical teams, and the most
experienced in particular, had much richer debates, driven
by concrete scenarios, anecdotes from experience, and
procedural thinking. Security experts showed a high
confidence in their decisions – despite some of them
having bad consequences – while the other groups tended
to doubt their own skills – even when they were playing
good games.
• Patterns: A number of characteristic plays could be
identified, some good (balance between priorities, open-
mindedness, and adapting strategies based on inputs that
challenge one’s pre-conceptions), some bad (excessive fo-
cus on particular issues, confidence in charismatic leaders),
some ugly (“tunnel vision” syndrome by over-confident
players). We document and discuss these patterns, showing
the virtue of the positive ones, discouraging the negative
ones, and inviting the readers to do their own introspection.
Conclusion: D-D complements existing work on gamifi-
cation as a means to improve security awareness, education,
and training. Beyond the analysis of the security decisions
of the three demographics, there is a definite educational and
awareness-raising aspect to D-D (as noted consistently by
players in all our subject groups). Game boxes will be brought
to the conference for demonstration purposes, and the audience
will be invited to experiment with D-D themselves, make their
own decisions, and reflect on their own perception of security.
